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Abstract
We consider decision problems under uncertainty
where the options available to a decision maker
and the resulting outcome are related through a
causal mechanism which is unknown to the de-
cision maker. We ask how a decision maker can
learn about this causal mechanism through se-
quential decision making as well as using current
causal knowledge inside each round in order to
make better choices had she not considered causal
knowledge and propose a decision making pro-
cedure in which an agent holds beliefs about her
environment which are used to make a choice
and are updated using the observed outcome. As
proof of concept, we present an implementation
of this causal decision making model and apply
it in a simple scenario. We show that the model
achieves a performance similar to the classic Q-
learning while it also acquires a causal model of
the environment.
1. Introduction
A fundamental part of intelligent reasoning is being able to
make decisions under uncertain conditions ((Danks, 2014),
(Lake et al., 2017), (Pearl, 2018b)). In some cases, a deci-
sion maker who faces an uncertain environment has enough
information to make choices by maximizing expected utility,
which is the classic formal criteria for making decisions if ra-
tional preferences are assumed ((Bernardo, 2000), (Gilboa,
2009)). On the other hand, if enough information is not
available, the decision maker could attempt to learn from
the environment by interacting with it.
Learning by interaction has been extensively studied by
computer scientists using the Reinforcement Learning (RL)
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setting (Sutton & Barto, 1998), but the most common used
techniques in this field are purely associative and do not
consider any high-level structure of the environment beyond
what is expressable in a Markov Decision Process (Garnelo
et al., 2016).
A particular case of a higher level structure; i.e., beyond
associative patterns, is the case of causal structure. A causal
structure encondes a series of cause-effect relations between
events and knowing such relations allows a decision maker
to add extra knowledge into the uncertainty of his environ-
ment and also allows it to plan ahead his actions since he
can predict what a certain action will cause ((Spirtes et al.,
2000), (Pearl, 2018a)).
Since human beings are known to learn causal models in se-
quential decision making processes ((Sloman & Hagmayer,
2006), (Nichols & Danks, 2007), (Meder et al., 2010), (Hag-
mayer & Meder, 2013), (Danks, 2014)), and even though
this learning is not perfect (Rottman & Hastie, 2014), we
propose that an autonomous agent can learn and use causal
information while interacting with an uncertain environment
which is governed by a fixed causal mechanism which is
unknown to the agent.
While the standard setting in RL is to model the agent-
environment interaction as an agent that moves from one
state to another inside a model of the environment and
observing a reward as these transitions occur, we propose to
model it as a game between the decision maker and a player
called Nature which will select his actions from the causal
model in response to what the decision maker has chosen.
The proposed way for an agent to learn from repeated in-
teractions is by giving her beliefs about the structure of the
environment and a way to update them after an outcome has
been observed. The agent, using her current beliefs, will
generate a local causal model and choose an action from it
as if that model was the true one. Then, after she observes
the consequences of her actions, her beliefs will be updated
according to the observed information in order to make a
better choice the next time. The agent, besides learning
a policy to choose actions will also learn a causal model
from the environment since the causal model she forms will
approximate the true model.
Learning a causal model of the environment allows to ex-
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tract high-level insights of a phenomena beyond associative
descriptions of what is observed. A causal model is able to
explain why a particular decision was made since it allows
to extract the causes and effects of an agent’s actions. Once
a causal model is acquired, an external user is able to reason
about what...if... statements that associative methods can
not answer (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). When a decision
maker chooses an action out of many, a causal model allows
to ask what would’ve happened if another action was taken
without actually performing the alternative action.
2. Related Work
Decision problems in which the actions available to a de-
cision maker are interventions over a known causal model
are analyzed by (Lattimore et al., 2016) as a bandit problem
where the optimal action must be learned over T rounds of
action-observation in which only one action can be chosen.
In a classic bandit problem an agent chooses an arm from a
slot machine, observes a reward and then moves on to the
next machine which is of the same kind and whose initial
settings are independent of the previous machine and action
(Sutton & Barto, 1998).
Several algorithms exists for finding the best arm in a multi-
arm bandit, such as those described in (Bubeck et al., 2009),
(Audibert & Bubeck, 2010), (Gabillon et al., 2012), (Agar-
wal et al., 2014) , (Jamieson et al., 2014), (Jamieson &
Nowak, 2014), (Chen & Li, 2015), (Carpentier & Locatelli,
2016), (Russo, 2016), (Kaufmann et al., 2016), but none of
these works consider causal-governed environments. In (Or-
tega & Braun, 2014) results on sequential decision-making
using Generalized Thompson Sampling that could be ex-
tended into causal inference problems are given.
As far as we know (Lattimore et al., 2016) is the first pa-
per to consider causal relations between the effects of ac-
tions. They consider a decision maker who must choose
the best among several possible interventions on a given
causal model. The optimality of the action in this context is
in terms of the minimal regret. The case where the causal
model is not known is left as future work.
By considering a causal model which is partially known and
intervening variables from the unknown part of the model
and by avoiding sampling arms that are considered sub-
optimal, (Sen et al., 2017) extend the work of (Lattimore
et al., 2016).
The aforementioned papers assume the causal model is
known to the decision makers so their work focuses on using
causal information to make good choices, but the problem
of acquiring this causal knowledge is left unattacked.
In this work we propose to acquire, by repeated interaction,
causal information about the environment as well as using
the current causal knowledge inside each round to make
better decisions. By modelling the environment as a player
in a game we allow it to have objectives to pursue which
will allow to model a rich family of situations where several
agents are competing against each other and a causal entity
controls the outcomes.
3. Problem setup
By causality we mean a stochastic binary relation between
events of a probability space (Ω,F ,P) denoted by → that
is transitive, irreflexive and antisymmetric (Spirtes et al.,
2000).
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) can be used to represent
all of the relations that occur in that space by considering
a node for every variable that is related to another and a
directed edge to express the causal relation, call this DAG
G and consider a probability measure PG that expresses the
conditional statements from the DAG.
We require that this measure satisfies the Markov Causal
Condition, Causal Minimality and Causal Faithfulness as
stated in (Spirtes et al., 2000). The relation between P and
PG is given by the Manipulation Theorem of (Spirtes et al.,
2000) and the Do-Calculus rules from (Pearl, 2009). We
also require that the condition known as Causal Sufficiency
is satisfied by the model, which means there are not any
causes lying outside of the model.
Let (A, E , C,) a Decision Problem under Uncertainty in
which an agent has to choose one among several options
a ∈ A which are causally related to the elements of C. The
elements in E are uncertain events which are governed by
a causal mechanism. This means that when the decision
maker chooses an action a, an uncertain event will occurr in
such a way that an outcome c will occur, which is causally
related to a. The decision maker seeks to maximize her util-
ity and we assume that she has rational preferences, so we
can substitute her preferences  for the expected value of a
utility function u (Gilboa, 2009). If the decision maker does
not know the probabilities nor the structure of the underlying
causal model then she can not calculate the expected utility
of any action. Instead, she will have a subjective probability
distribution which represents the agent’s knowledge and
uncertainties which will be updated by interacting with the
environment through succesive rounds of decision making.
Inside each round, any response from the environment will
be independent from the previous rounds, but the actions of
the decision maker will be based upon previously acquired
causal information and are expected to improve the utility
for the agent.
We define a game between the decision maker and a new
abstract player called Nature. The base game’s structure
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will be the same as the original decision problem. Nature
will be indifferent among the possible outcomes of the game
and will select its actions from the causal model. This is
interpreted as the causal response from the environment to
the actions of the decision maker. Nature having objectives
to pursue (non-constant payments) will be left as future
work.
For an agent to reason about and modify her causal knowl-
edge we endow her with a probability distribution p(θ) over
a suitable space. The beliefs must allow to form a local
model in a given moment to be used for decision making.
We will later exploit the fact that causal graphical models
can be expressed in terms of conditional distributions, so
having beliefs about a causal model is equivalent to having
beliefs about these conditional distributions. After each
round of the game, the beliefs will be updated in a Bayesian
way in order to achieve convergence towards the true model
(Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008).
4. Proposed Method
In this section we describe our approach for studying deci-
sion making in causal environments as described in Section
3. For the sake of explanation we consider three separate
cases:
• The decision maker fully knows the causal model.
• The decision maker knows only the structure of the
causal model.
• The decision maker does not know the causal model.
4.1. The causal model is completely known
Consider a decision problem under uncertainty where a
decision maker has to choose on out of many elements
of a set A and where the consequences, or effects, of her
actions are expressed as the outcome of a random variable
Y which we will call target variable. The relation between
values of Y and actions a ∈ A is expressed by a causal
graphical model G, which is known by the decision maker.
The decision maker whishes to choose an action a ∈ A such
that the observed value of Y maximizes her utility. It is
assumed that the variable that is going to be intervened is
known by the decision maker; i.e., she knows what variable
can she intervene.
This is the simplest case of the three mentioned because
if the decision maker fully knows the causal model, then
she can proceed as in classic decision problems by directly
obtaining the probabilities of different values for the target
variable given that an action is made and choose a which
achieves the highest probability for the desired value of the
target variable. The action selected will be a best response
for the decision maker as well as the maximum expected
utility choice.
Pearl’s do-calculus (Pearl, 2009) says that the effect of set-
ting some variable Xi to a value xj can be expressed in
terms of observational distributions as follows:
P (X1, ..., Xn|do(Xi = j)) =
∏
k 6=i
P (Xk|Pa(Xk)).
The decision maker can use this expression to find the prob-
abilities for her desired value of the target variable given the
possible interventions available to her.
4.2. Only the structure is known
If only the graphical structure of G is known, then it is
not obvious how to find the best action to make since the
information required for calculating expected utilities is not
available.
In this case, the decision maker will attempt to learn from
her uncertain environment by forming beliefs over unknown
parameters of the environment and update them according to
the observed outcomes. In order to make a Bayesian update
over the parameters, these must be defined in such way that
in each round the decision maker can define a causal model
from the parameters in order to make a decision using this
model as if it was the true one as described in Section 4.1.
To model the interaction between the decision maker and
the environment, we consider a game with the following
characteristics:
• Players: The set of players of this game is the set
whose elements are the original decision maker, and a
player called Nature.
• Actions: The actions for the decision maker are the
available options she has in the decision problem;i.e.
A. The actions of Nature are possible realizations of
the variables of the causal model.
• Preferences: The decision maker satisfies the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of rationality and there-
fore it is assumed to be maximizing expected utilities.
Nature is indifferent over outcomes.
• Beliefs: Since the decision maker has uncertainty
about her environment, she will encode it in a proba-
bility distribution p(θ) over a suitable space.
In this game we will assume that Nature moves first and
assigns some state to the environment which is unknown to
the decision maker. For this reason, the base game is an ex-
tensive game with imperfect information since the decision
maker makes a choice without knowing the play made by
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Nature. We choose extensive games since Nature’s moves
are interpreted as a response from the causal model to the
actions of the decision maker, so a sequential interpretation
had to be considered.
Since the decision maker knows the graph structure, she
can explicitly find a non interventional expression for the
interventional distribution and update her beliefs about these
unknown quantities from observed data. If the decision
maker were not allowed to know, at the end of each round,
the play of the Nature then this will have to be estimated
as a hidden variable using, for example, the EM algorithm
(Dempster et al., 1977), but meanwhile we are assuming
that this information is available at the end of each round.
Given the structure of the model; i.e., the variables in it and
the directed edges, the joint distribution of those variables
can be expressed as a product of the form P (Xj |Pa(Xj))
where Pa(Xj) are the parents of Xj in the underlying DAG
in G. Since these distributions fully characterize the model,
the decision maker will have beliefs over each one of these
parameters. Notice that each of these parameters is itself
a distribution of length equal to the number of possible
values of the variable which is being conditioned, call the
maximum number of possible values k .
A distribution suitable to modelling discrete probability
vectors is the k-dimensional Dirichlet distribution, whose
support is the set of probability vectors of length k (Hjort
et al., 2010). The k dimensional Dirichlet distribution has a
density f with respect to the Lebesgue measure given by
f(x1, ..., xk|αi, ..., αk) = 1
B(α)
k∏
i=1
xαi−1i ,
where (x1, ..., xk) are such that
∑k
i=1 xi = 1 and α =
(α1, ..., αk). The Dirichlet distribution is useful since it is
conjugate for itself (Bernardo, 2000).
In this way, the decision maker will have beliefs about
the CPT’s in the form of parameters of several Dirichlet
distributions. Using the agent’s current beliefs, a causal
graphical model can be specified. Using this fully specified
(structure + parameters) as a true model, the decision maker
will make her choice as in Case 1. When the decision maker
observes the value of the target variable, she will update the
parameters that specify her beliefs.
Previously we argued that the agent’s beliefs were going to
be distributions over a suitable space, but what is going to
be updated are the parameters of such distributions. Namely,
the α corresponding to the Dirichlet random variable as-
signed to each CPT.
For the belief updating, given a new data point, two cases
must be considered:
• The variable to update has no parents.
• The variable to update has parents.
In the first case, if a prior Dirichlet(α) is used, then the
posterior is given by
Dirichlet(α+ c)
where c is a vector of the number of occurrences of that
observed data point.
For the second case, we must consider both the occurrences
of that data point as well as the parents for each of the
variables. Following (Barber, 2012) we denote as θi(X, j)
the number of times the event {X = i|Pa(X) = j} is
observed. In this case, if the prior of Xi conditioned on
its parents having the value j is given by a a Dirichlet(α),
then the posterior for the variable Xi given an observed data
point is given by∏
j
Dirichlet(α+ θi(·, j)).
4.3. The model is not known
The causal model were fully unknown, the decision maker
will have to deal with the problem using only any previous
knowledge and her own intuitions. Again, any previous
knowledge and considerations will be expressed as beliefs
about the uncertainties in the environment, which will take
the form of a probability distributions over a suitable space.
As in the previous case, we consider a repeated game where
the base game consists of Nature assigning a random state
of the environment and responding to the agents choices
with the effects that were caused by her decisions. In this
game, as well as in the previous one, the decision maker will
attempt to learn by updating, and using, beliefs in a suitable
way.
The most notable difference with the previous case is that
the structure of the model is also to be learned in such a
way that both the structure and parameters converge to the
true model in the limit. In the previous case the decision
maker knew the form of the Conditional Probability Tables
(CPT) involved in any calculation. In this case, she doesn’t
know the structure of the DAG so which CPT’s are involved
is unknown.
If the decision maker knew which variables appear in the
true model that governs the environment, even though she
didn’t know how they are connected, she could use a Dirich-
let Process to generate Dirichlet distributions and generate
causal graphical models the same way as in Case 2 and
updating the parameters of the process using the observed
information. The Dirichlet Process1, which was introduced
1with parameters M,G0
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by (Ferguson, 1973), is random measure defined over a
space S such that for each partition B1, ..., Bk the vector
(G(B1), ..., G(Bk)) follows a Dirichlet distribution (Hjort
et al., 2010), (Mu¨ller et al., 2016), (Ghosal & van der Vaart,
2017).
Belief updating using causal information when the deci-
sion maker doesn’t know the structure of the model nor its
parameters is yet to be studied and left as future work.
5. Test scenario
We consider the following hypothetical example where the
proposed method will be tested.
Consider a patient who arrives at a hospital who can either
have disease A or disease B. The doctor can either give
him some pill or send him into surgery. Both treatments
entail risks and whether the treatment cures the patient or
not depends on which disease it had originally. The doctor
could be facing a mutation from a known disease, so she has
some knowledge about what could happen if a treatment is
given to the patient. Using her previous knowledge as a true
model, she can choose a treatment and observe the outcome
from which she will learn about this disease, so she could
make a better decision the next time a similar patient arrives.
The causal model that governs this situation is shown in Fig-
ure 1. The parameters for this model were fixed intuitively
in such a way that each treatment is effective for only one
disease, but the most effective treatment is riskier.
The variables in the model are:
• Disease: Either A or B.
• Treatment: Either pill or surgery.
• Reaction: Either dying or surviving.
• Lives: Either living or dying.
The variables are causally related as shown in Figure 1.
The variable Lives is the target variable and, in this example,
the only variable that can be intervened upon is the variable
Treatment. The decision maker prefers an outcome in which
the patient lives.
In this scenario, Nature’s move will consist in randomly
assigning a disease to the patient. Then, the medic will
asign a treatment using his current beliefs about the disease
and the possible outcomes. The decision nodes for this play
of the medic form an information set because the medic
doesn’t know how she arrived there since she doesn’t know
what disease did Nature assign. Finally, Nature will sample
the consequence of the treatment from the causal model and
the medic will observe the outcome.
Figure 1. Causal graphical model for the test scenario: the target
variable Lives is causally influenced by the disease the patient has,
the treatment assigned and the survival to the secondary effects of
treatment.
For this test scenario whose causal graphical model is shown
in Figure 1, we see by applying the Pearl’s do-calculus that
the interventional distribution Pdo(Tr)(Y ) is given by
P (Y |do(Tr)) = P (Y |D,Tr,R)P (R|Tr)P (D).
In fact, from the structure of the model, which is shown
in Figure 1, we see that the involved probabilities in any
calculations are:
P (disease), P (treatment), P (reaction|treatment),
and
P (lives|disease, treatment, reaction).
We can also see that the joint distribution for all of the
variables can be expressed as
P (Y |D,Tr,R)P (R|Tr)P (D)P (Tr).
This expression will be useful when specifying beliefs about
the model as Dirichlet distributions.
6. Experiment
As proof of concept we implemented Case 1 and Case 2 for
the test scenario and compared it with an agent performing
Q-learning (Watkins & Dayan, 1992) and an agent choosing
her actions at random.
For the implementation, we defined a true causal model as
the one shown in Figure 1 using the library Pgmpy (Ankan &
Panda, 2015). Then, we defined an agent which has beliefs
for each of the CPT that appear in the factorization for the
model and randomly assigned values for the α parameters
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for each one of the Dirichlet distributions as mentioned
before.
This agent will find the action that maximizes her desired
value for the target variable using do-calculus. The action
thus selected will be used as evidence in the true causal
model and a MAP inference will be used to simulate the
most likely outcome given this action. The target variable
will output a 1 value if the patient lives. The value of the
target variable will be the reward of each round.
6.1. Case 1: The causal model is completely known
If the causal model is completely known to the decision
maker, then in one step she can obtain the probability for
her desired value of the target variable, which in this case is
the value corresponding to the outcome in which the patient
lives at the end. Using this probability, she can choose
which treatment to assign. Since this action maximizes the
probability of the occurence desired value, it maximizes the
expected utility, and it is also a best response to the player
Nature.
6.2. Case 2: Only the structure is known
From the expression of the joint probability we notice that
we need to specify a distribution over each one of these
distributions, which will be each one a Dirichlet distribution.
We begin with a random assignation of the α parameter
for each of the distributions considered. We use Dirichlet
distribution for each of the conditional probability tables
that appear in the factorization of the joint probability for
the graph of G. Since each of the variables in the model is
binary, then the product of these Dirichlets is again Dirichlet.
With this parameters, the decision maker forms a causal
model and chooses the action that maximizes the probability
of the desired value for target variable as in Case 1. With
this action chosen, we simulate an outcome from the causal
graphical model using the chosen action as an intervention.
This evidence is used to update the parameters, which then
will be used to generate a new causal model, and so on.
We show the results of the experiment, where we compare
the performance obtained by the causal agent, a random
agent who selects his actions at random, and an agent per-
forming Q-learning. We show the average reward obtained
by the agent over 20, 50, 100 and 200 rounds.
In Figure 2 we observe the average rewards for each agent
in 20 rounds of decision making. Here we notice that Q-
learning outperforms our algorithm, which has a similar
performance as the random choosing procedure until round
11.
In Figure 3 we observe the average rewards for each agent in
50 rounds of decision making. Our algorithm follow closely
Figure 2. Average reward obtained in each round for each agent
the Q-learning agent and outperform the random agent.
Figure 3. Average reward obtained in each round for each agent
In Figure 4 we observe the average reward obtained by the
three agents in 100 rounds, where our algorithm slightly
outperforms Q-Learning.
In Figure 5 we observe the average reward obtained by the
three agents in 200 rounds. The average reward obtained is
very similar for Q-learning and our algorithm.
We see that our method obtains a very similar reward as the
classic Q-learning algorithm for a larger number of rounds,
where the random agent is outperformed. Even though
our model has a similar performance to a classic learning
algorithm it learns a causal model of the environment which
allows it to explain why an agent chose her actions as well
as allowing conterfactual reasoning.
Playing against Nature: causal discovery for decision making under uncertainty
Figure 4. Average reward obtained in each round for each agent
Figure 5. Average reward obtained in each round for each agent
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we have proposed a way to make decisions in
uncertain environments which are known to be governed
by causal mechanisms. The proposed decision making pro-
cedure attempts to resemble how human beings act when
causal relations are present. Human beings are known to
use, and modify, causal knowledge when making decisions.
This ideas motivated us to study how an autonomous agent
could learn from her environment when it has a particular
structure, in this case being causal relations what gives the
environment a certain structure.
We assumed here that the decision maker is aware of the
causal nature of the environment, but lacks information
about its specific parameters which are to be learned by
interaction. It is reasonable to assume that the variables
involved are known, since in many situations we are aware
of what we are intervening upon and what do we expect it
to affect.
The experimental results show that considering causal struc-
ture in a decision making process yields a good performance
when compared to non-causal classic algorithms, but our
model has the extra feature of learning a causal model of
the environment which could be exported for problems in-
volving similar scenarios.
The problem of discovering the variables itself and the con-
nections between them is far more general and it is left as
future work.
8. Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the National Institute of Astrophysics
Optics and Electronics (INAOE) and to Mrs. Graciela Soto
for their generous funding in order to attend ICML 2018.
References
Agarwal, Alekh, Hsu, Daniel, Kale, Satyen, Langford, John,
Li, Lihong, and Schapire, Robert. Taming the monster:
A fast and simple algorithm for contextual bandits. In
International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 1638–
1646, 2014.
Ankan, Ankur and Panda, Abinash. pgmpy: Probabilis-
tic graphical models using python. In Proceedings of
the 14th Python in Science Conference (SCIPY 2015).
Citeseer, 2015.
Audibert, Jean-Yves and Bubeck, Se´bastien. Best arm iden-
tification in multi-armed bandits. In COLT-23th Confer-
ence on Learning Theory-2010, pp. 13–p, 2010.
Barber, David. Bayesian Reasoning and Machine Learning.
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Bernardo, JM. Bayesian theory. Wiley Series in Probability
and Statistics., 2000.
Bubeck, Se´bastien, Munos, Re´mi, and Stoltz, Gilles. Pure
exploration in multi-armed bandits problems. In Inter-
national conference on Algorithmic learning theory, pp.
23–37. Springer, 2009.
Carpentier, Alexandra and Locatelli, Andrea. Tight (lower)
bounds for the fixed budget best arm identification bandit
problem. In Conference on Learning Theory, pp. 590–
604, 2016.
Chen, Lijie and Li, Jian. On the optimal sample com-
plexity for best arm identification. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1511.03774, 2015.
Danks, David. Unifying the mind: Cognitive representations
as graphical models. MIT Press, 2014.
Playing against Nature: causal discovery for decision making under uncertainty
Dempster, Arthur P., Laird, Nan M., and Rubin, Donald B.
Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via the em
algorithm. Journal of the royal statistical society. Series
B (methodological), pp. 1–38, 1977.
Ferguson, Thomas S. A bayesian analysis of some nonpara-
metric problems. The Annals of Statistics, 1(2):209–230,
1973.
Gabillon, Victor, Ghavamzadeh, Mohammad, and Lazaric,
Alessandro. Best arm identification: A unified approach
to fixed budget and fixed confidence. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 3212–3220,
2012.
Garnelo, Marta, Arulkumaran, Kai, and Shanahan, Murray.
Towards deep symbolic reinforcement learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1609.05518, 2016.
Ghosal, Subhashis and van der Vaart, Aad. Fundamentals
of nonparametric Bayesian inference, volume 44. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017.
Gilboa, Itzhak. Theory of Decision under Uncertainty. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009.
Hagmayer, York and Meder, Bjo¨rn. Repeated causal de-
cision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(1):33, 2013.
Hjort, Nils Lid, Holmes, Chris, Mu¨ller, Peter, and Walker,
Stephen G. Bayesian nonparametrics, volume 28. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010.
Jamieson, Kevin and Nowak, Robert. Best-arm identifi-
cation algorithms for multi-armed bandits in the fixed
confidence setting. In Information Sciences and Systems
(CISS), 2014 48th Annual Conference on, pp. 1–6. IEEE,
2014.
Jamieson, Kevin, Malloy, Matthew, Nowak, Robert, and
Bubeck, Se´bastien. lilucb: An optimal exploration algo-
rithm for multi-armed bandits. In Conference on Learning
Theory, pp. 423–439, 2014.
Kaufmann, Emilie, Cappe´, Olivier, and Garivier, Aure´lien.
On the complexity of best-arm identification in multi-
armed bandit models. The Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 17(1):1–42, 2016.
Lake, Brenden M., Ullman, Tomer D., Tenenbaum,
Joshua B., and Gershman, Samuel J. Building machines
that learn and think like people. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 40, 2017.
Lattimore, Finnian, Lattimore, Tor, and Reid, Mark D.
Causal bandits: Learning good interventions via causal
inference. In Lee, D. D., Sugiyama, M., Luxburg, U. V.,
Guyon, I., and Garnett, R. (eds.), Advances in Neural In-
formation Processing Systems 29, pp. 1181–1189. Curran
Associates, Inc., 2016.
Meder, Bjo¨rn, Gerstenberg, Tobias, Hagmayer, York, and
Waldmann, Michael R. Observing and intervening: Ra-
tional and heuristic models of causal decision making.
The Open Psychology Journal, 3:119–135, 2010.
Mu¨ller, Peter, Quintana, Fernando Andre´s, Jara, Alejandro,
and Hanson, Tim. Bayesian nonparametric data analysis.
Springer series in Statistics, 2016.
Nichols, William and Danks, David. Decision making using
learned causal structures. In Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, volume 29,
2007.
Ortega, Pedro A. and Braun, Daniel A. Generalized thomp-
son sampling for sequential decision-making and causal
inference. Complex Adaptive Systems Modeling, 2(1):2,
2014.
Pearl, Judea. Causality. Cambridge university press, 2009.
Pearl, Judea. Theoretical impediments to machine learn-
ing with seven sparks from the causal revolution. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1801.04016, 2018a.
Pearl, Judea and Mackenzie, Dana. The Book of Why: The
New Science of Cause and Effect. Basic Books, 2018.
Pearl, J., Mackenzie D. The Book of Why: The New Science
of Cause and Effect. Basic Books, 2018b.
Rottman, Benjamin Margolin and Hastie, Reid. Reasoning
about causal relationships: Inferences on causal networks.
Psychological bulletin, 140(1):109, 2014.
Russo, Daniel. Simple bayesian algorithms for best arm
identification. In Conference on Learning Theory, pp.
1417–1418, 2016.
Sen, Rajat, Shanmugam, Karthikeyan, Dimakis, Alexan-
dros G, and Shakkottai, Sanjay. Identifying best interven-
tions through online importance sampling. In Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 3057–3066,
2017.
Shoham, Yoav and Leyton-Brown, Kevin. Multiagent sys-
tems: Algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical founda-
tions. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Sloman, Steven A. and Hagmayer, York. The causal psycho-
logic of choice. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(9):
407–412, 2006.
Spirtes, Peter, Glymour, Clark N., and Scheines, Richard.
Causation, prediction, and search. MIT press, 2000.
Playing against Nature: causal discovery for decision making under uncertainty
Sutton, Richard S. and Barto, Andrew G. Reinforcement
learning: An introduction. MIT Press, 1998.
Watkins, Christopher JCH and Dayan, Peter. Q-learning.
Machine learning, 8(3-4):279–292, 1992.
